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THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON BANKING:
THE EFFECT AND IMPLICATIONS OF
"DECONSTRUCTION" OF BANKING FUNCTIONS
JULIE L. WILLIAMS

JAMES F.E. GILLESPIE, JR.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)2 in
late 1999 punctuated the close of the millennium and, according to
some commentators, the beginning of fundamental change in the
structure of the Nation's financial industry. Indeed, GLBA is
landmark legislation. It allows types of financial companies to
affiliate that previously were not permitted to do so, and it allows
companies directly to provide products previously allowed to be
provided only by other types of firms. In broad terms, GLBA's
financial modernization facilitates growth in the size of financial
services firms, and may encourage consolidations, because it
enables financial companies to conduct new activities via
ownership of additional types of businesses.
One of the most significant, far-reaching-and technologydriven-trends becoming evident in the financial services industry
represents
quite
a
different
dimension
of
financial
modernization-modernization based on a type of deconsolidation, or "deconstruction," of financial functions. The process of
separating out the different functions of a financial instrumentorigination, servicing, absorbing particular risk components-has
been a revolutionary development in financial markets over the
1. Ms. Williams is First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel and Mr.
Gillespie is Assistant Chief Counsel at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily

represent the views of the OCC.
2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public Law No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12,
1999) (codified in scattered sections predominantly of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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last twenty years.
Today, we see the same process of
deconstruction engulfing all aspects of the banking business. By
"deconstruction" we mean the separation or segmentation of
banking products, services, and operations into their component
parts or processes so that they can be provided or obtained
separately?
Typically, discussions of how the phenomenon of
"deconstruction" affects the banking business focus on how
deconstruction of banks' traditional functions enables their
competitors to "cherry-pick" segments of banks' business.4 Indeed,
advances in technology make the component functions of banking
ever more divisible. But today, a key to a bank's success may lie it
its ability to take a deconstructed approach to its own business. Put
another way, if banks' competitors gain advantages by "cherrypicking" segments of their banking business, why shouldn't banks
do the same?
The manifestations and implications of
"deconstruction" of the banking business, and how those are aided
and abetted by technology, are the subject of this article.
II. "DECONSTRUCTION" OF THE BANKING BUSINESS
What is being deconstructed? The traditional vertically
and horizontally integrated banking firm that produces and
delivers its products, through its outlets, to its customers is being
picked apart. Examples are easy to find. What is easy to miss,
however, is how the examples are pieces of a larger picture puzzle
that represents a fundamentally different way of looking at the
business of banking; one in which the different capacities,
3. See, e.g., Carol E. Curtis, Deconstructing the Customer, U.S. BANKER, Feb.

1998, at 25; Stephen Timewell & Kung Young, How the Internet Redefines Banking,
THE BANKER, June 1999, at 27-30; Deconstructing the Banking System, RETAIL
BANKER INT'L, May 29, 2000; Deloitte & Touche Consulting Group, The Future of
Retail Banking (1995), at 29-34; David T. Llewellyn, Banking in the 21st Century: The
Transformation of an Industry (paper presented at the 49th International Banking
Summer School, Sorrento, June 1996) (on file with author).
4. This is not a new concern. For example, it arose during the Congressional
hearings held in the early 1980's on the effect on banks of the then-new money
market mutual funds and "Cash Management Accounts" offered by securities firms
which were one of the early forms of deconstruction. See, e.g., Competition and
Conditions in the FinancialSystem: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing,and UrbanAffairs, 97th Cong. I' Sess. (1981).
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competencies and attributes of a banking firm are the pieces.
Moreover, technology both helps to create more and more pieces
and helps to assemble them rapidly and seamlessly.
Consider the example of the most traditional of bank
products - a loan. From one perspective, a loan is a single
product. From a deconstructed perspective, however, a loan is a
series of functions: evaluating risk; originating the loan; funding
the loan; servicing/administering the loan; and holding the loan
asset. None of these functions is necessarily unique to a bank, and
any particular bank could chose to do some or all of them,
depending upon its comparative advantage relative to competitors
performing the same functions. Moreover, a bank with a capacity
for a particular function, such as loan servicing, may "export" that
capacity by marketing it to other (bank or nonbank) businesses,
while another bank may determine that it does not want to
develop that capacity and looks for a third party from which it can
"import" the function.
Similarly, a bank may decide that it is important for its
customers to have access to a broad range of products, but rather
than producing those products itself, it may act as a "finder" and
import choices to give its customers access to products from other
providers. A bank may even detach its name and regulatory status
from its own products and services and market under the bank's
name products or services produced or originated by a third
party-in effect, deconstructing its brand and its reputation.
This kind of "deconstructed" perspective on the banking
business enables a banking firm to analyze the components of how
it does business, what it does, what it does well, and where it may
have a particular advantage in an activity. A firm may decide,
piece by piece, whether it commits resources to perform a
particular function itself, or hires another company to do it;
whether it produces a particular product, or makes products
originated by third parties available to its customers; whether it
has particular capacities and competencies that translate into new
business opportunities; and whether there are other attributes of
the bank that are marketable.
Why is all this important? Because a view of the banking
business as divisible into component pieces enables banks to play
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to their strengths; to commit resources to the particular processes
they do best, where they have a comparative advantage; and to
gain access to skills, expertise and products, without having to
develop them in-house. A bank's advantage in conducting an
activity itself may come from economies of scale, its particular
competence, or attributes that distinguish it from other providers
of the same product or service. When the banking firm does not
have an advantage producing the product, service or function
itself, however, it can look to "import" it from another source.
In addition, when -a line of business is viewed as a series of
functions, entry and exit barriers should be lowered since a
banking firm may enter a new activity without developing an
entire productive process and may exit a business line without
having to dismantle the infrastructure for an entire function. A
bank may make a strategic, limited entry into a particular activity,
limit its expenditures, and exit with a containable exposure. Thus,
in general, it should be desirable for a banking firm to have the
both ability and the option of analyzing its current and prospective
business in a deconstructed fashion.
The range of options for national banks that deconstruction
provides5 is important for banks of all sizes, but may be
particularly useful for small and mid-sized banks. These banks can
use deconstruction options to obtain an economy of scale in bank
processes that is unavailable to them under the conventional
approach of fully integrated producer and provider. Moreover,
deconstruction of functions enables small and medium size banks
to exploit niche markets and to develop business plans with more
flexibility than a traditional fully-integrated bank. Thus, the
implications of deconstruction can be favorable for community
and mid-sized banks--provided they use deconstruction options
both creatively and prudently. In the latter respect, it is crucial
that institutions have the requisite expertise to understand and
oversee the risks presented when they "import" products or
functions provided by third parties.
Finally, the ability to deconstruct and segment banking
5. These options include outsource contracts, minority investments, finder
activities, sale as agent, and sale as principal both directly and under joint marketing

arrangements.
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services, products, and operations raises the intriguing possibility
that the focus of GLBA on ownership relationships between
different types of financial firms may not be the main event in
financial modernization. Issues of corporate structure, including
the debate about conducting activities in holding company
affiliates versus bank subsidiaries, may turn out to be of secondary
importance to the success of financial firms. It may be less
important for a banking firm to be able to directly conduct new
types of financial activities, or to own another company that does,
than it is for the firm to be able to segment its functions and do
more of what is most profitable or otherwise advantageous, and
less of what is not. In other words, non-structural options, not
premised on ownership of companies engaged in particular
functions, may be equally or even more effective and efficient for a
banking organization than growing its corporate family.
Technology both enables and encourages deconstruction.
It vastly enhances the ability of banking firms to deconstruct and
segment their business and creates new opportunities for them
based upon strategic exploitation of advantages associated with
particular segments of that business. Generally, we can categorize
the effects of deconstruction of the banking business, and the
impact of technology on this trend, in four basic ways:
1. Use of third parties to perform functions on a
bank's behalt A bank contracts with third party
providers to perform components of the bank's
operations.
2. Providing access to products and services of
other providers. The bank makes products and
services originated by others available to the bank's
customers.
3. Marketing processes and activities for which the
bank has particular capacities and competencies.
Functions and activities that the bank performs for
its own operations are marketed to third parties.
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4. "Franchising" the bank's attributes. The bank
"franchises" its attributes by lending its name or
regulated entity status to products and services
originated by others or activities predominantly
conducted by others.
A.

Use of Third Partiesto PerformFunctions on a Bank's
Behalf

It is well-recognized that third-party vendors, brokers,
dealers and agents offer banks a variety of systems and services, as
well as products designed to diversify bank assets and sources of
revenue, and to reduce costs. Use of third party vendors for
various back-office systems and software is common, and the more
recent development of banks' retaining third party vendors to
establish and operate an Internet web site is becoming increasingly
so. For example, internal OCC studies indicate that of the
national banks offering their customers transactional web sites,
more than two-thirds are reliant upon a third party to operate that
web site.
Today, services commonly outsourced include core
processing; information and transaction processing and settlement
and activities for lending, deposit-taking, funds transfer, fiduciary,
or trading activities; Internet related services; security monitoring;
systems development and maintenance; aggregation services;
digital certification services; and call centers.' Other more unusual
recent manifestations of this aspect of deconstruction are
initiatives by some banks to contract out bank internal functions,
such a human resources administration and internal audit.
When it comes to innovations in technology, this trend has
some interesting twists. Traditionally, outsourcing was limited to a
single vendor for a particular functionality. In the traditional third
party vendor scenario, a banking firm contracts with a third party
6. FFIEC Guidance on Managing Risks Associated With Outsourcing
Technology Serices, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
60-707, at
69,287 n.2 (OCC Advisory Letter No. 2000-12, Nov. 28, 2000), available at http:/l
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-12.doc (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter
Outsourcing Guidance].

2001] "DECONSTRUCTION" OFBANKING FUNCTIONS

141

vendor to provide a specified back-office system or function. But
today, a bank may be exploring new technologies that support the
creation and provision of new financial products and services. In
other words, the sought-after technology or new product or
function may not yet exist-it is not on the shelf-at least not in
the form the banking firm wants.
In this setting, participation in the development of
standards and industry protocols for new technology, and in the
development of delivery systems and equipment, are vital in order
to ensure that the new standards and equipment are optimal for
delivering the types of banking products and services that a bank
wants to provide. New technologies need to function compatibly
with banks' "legacy" systems And, involvement of a continuing
nature may be necessary in order to insure that the product or
system remains available to the bank and is developed consistent
with the bank's needs.
To be able to guide the creation, deployment, and access to
an innovation, however, may require that the banking firm
participate in some form of joint arrangement with the other
companies participating in the project. Theoretically, this might
take the form of controlling the technology company that is
contributing the technical expertise, either as an affiliate or
subsidiary of the bank-and this ownership structure is the model
GLBA addresses. But if a bank were exploring a variety of
technology-based initiatives, that could mean buying control of a
lot of technology companies. A more efficient method may be for
a banking organization to make strategic investments in those
companies or ventures with which it seeks to partner in the
development of technology related to producing and delivering
financial products and services. This enables the banking firm to
explore a variety of initiatives while containing its exposure by
making only the limited investments necessary to gain a
technology partner needed for particular technology-based
initiatives.
7. Legacy systems are the information resources currently available to the
organization. They include existing mainframes, personal computers, serial terminals,
networks, databases, operating systems, application programs and all other forms of
hardware and software that a company may own.
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If banks fail to develop technologies and standards that
support their banking business, they risk being burdened with
standards and limitations developed with other industries in mind,
rather than tailored for the production and delivery of banking
products and services. They may find that new systems integrate
poorly with their existing system, or that their access to needed
technology systems and resources is restricted. At best, this
impedes the effective development and efficient delivery of
banking products; at worst, it puts banks at a competitive
disadvantage as technology-based products and services
proliferate.
This scenario illustrates an important current example of
deconstruction of aspects of banking activities-the use of third
parties to develop standards, products and services based on new
technologies. The example also illustrates that the most effective,
and perhaps necessary, way to do so is through relationships with
third parties that go beyond simply contracting for a product or
service.
In this context, the OCC's precedents regarding permissible
types of investments for national banks are significant because
they recognize that non-controlling investments by national banks
in companies where the purpose of the investment is linked to a
business purpose of the bank, are "incidental to banking" because
they are "convenient or useful" to accomplishing a bank's banking
business. Indeed, given the pervasive implications of technology
on the banking business, such investments could easily be viewed
as necessary to the future success of banking firms. The Federal
Reserve Board also has recognized this vital linkage in its recent
proposal asking for comments on whether such strategic
investments should be viewed as financial in nature, incidental to a
financial activity, or "complementary" to a financial activity.8
OCC has developed two related but distinct lines of
precedent on the authority of national banks to make strategic
investments.
These have different standards and different
limitations. First, OCC permits minority investments, subject to
8. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,384,
80,385 (proposed Dec. 21,2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
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four requirements, where all the activities of the target entity are

either part of the business of banking or incidental thereto.
Second, OCC permits limited equity investments in entities
engaged in activities that are not bank-permissible, if the bank's
investment is "incidental"-convenient, useful, or necessary-to
performing permissible banking functions.
With respect to the first category, "minority investments,"
the OCC has permitted national banks to own, either directly or
indirectly through an operating subsidiary, a noncontrolling

interest in an enterprise' provided four criteria or standards are
met." These standards, which have been distilled from previous
decisions in the area of permissible noncontrolling investments for
national banks and their subsidiaries," are:

1. The activities of the enterprise in which the
investment is made must be limited to activities that
are part of, or incidental to, the business of banking
(or otherwise authorized for a national bank);
2. The bank must be able to prevent the enterprise
from engaging in activities that do not meet the
foregoing standard, or be able to withdraw its
investment;
9. See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval No. 210 (July 15, 1996), 1996 WL
479234, availableat http:llwww.occ.treas.govlinterplaugustlconap2l0.htm(last visited
Feb. 2, 2001). See also, 12 C.F.R. § 5.36 (2000) (65 Fed. Reg. 12,905 (Mar. 10, 2000),
as amended by 65 Fed. Reg. 41,559 (July 6,2000)).
10. NationalBanks Were Able to Invest in a Limited Liability Company, at Levels
Less than Required for an Operating Subsidiary, Since the Investments Met Certain
Requirements, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-007
(OCC Interpretive Letter No. 692, Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 692]; A National Bank Was Able to Make a Non-Controlling Minority
Investment in a Limited Liability Company that Purchasesand Resells Secured Home
Improvement Loans, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81009 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 694, Dec. 13, 1995) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 694].
11. See Banks Could Invest in Bank Holding Company that Provided Electronic
Funds Transfer Services, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
81-409 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 890, May 15, 2000); A NationalBank Was Able
to Establish an OperatingSubsidiary to Serve as GeneralPartnerin a PartnershipThat
Will Own a Trust Company, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81-012 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 697, Nov. 15,1995); OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 694, supra note 10; OCC Interpretive Letter No. 692, supra note 10.
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3. The bank's loss exposure must be limited, as a
legal and accounting matter, and the bank must not
have open-ended liability for the obligations of the
enterprise; and
4. The investment must be convenient or useful to
the bank in carrying out its business and not a mere
passive investment unrelated to the investing bank's
business.
Specifically, the OCC has found that under their incidental
powers, national banks have authority to make minority
investments where the investment facilitates the banks'
participation in a connected and otherwise permissible banking
activity.12 This requirement is met when the investments are
convenient or useful to the investing bank in conducting its
banking business rather than a mere passive or speculative
investment.' This is a long-standing position of the OCC. 4
The OCC has frequently permitted national banks to
exercise this minority investment authority either to acquire
technology necessary for the business of banking or to have an
active role in establishing standards for technology-based systems
and processes that are part of or are convenient or useful to the
banking business. Thus, with respect to acquiring necessary
technology, OCC has authorized national banks to own minority
interests in firms developing financially related software.15
12. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 692, supra note 10 (concluding that a national
bank may make a minority investment in a limited liability company that supports a
savings amending program for parents of prospective students).
13. Id.
14. See Letter of James J. Saxon (Oct. 12, 1966) (unpublished letter, on file with
author) (discussing a minority interest in a corporation that operated a credit card
clearing house for the benefit of the owner banks). Banks considering operating
subsidiaries and minority investments in conjunction with outsourcing arrangements
should refer to OCC regulations 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34, 5.36 (2000) regarding the
permissibility of the activities to be conducted.
15. OCC Corporate Decision No. 2000-01 (Jan. 29, 2000), 2000 WL 303083,
available at http:lwww.occ.treas.gov/interp/febOO/cdOO-Ol.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2001) (concluding that a national bank can acquire a software company that owns
software that enables users to make changes to their web sites where the bank will
sell the software only as part of a bundle of Internet web hosting services provided to
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Likewise, OCC has authorized minority investments in joint
ventures that develop and operate industry-wide standards,
processes, or systems to support electronic banking activities. 6
its merchant customers); Bank Could Hold Minority Interest in Internet Payment
Service Provider,[1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-362
(OCCInterpretive Letter No. 868, Aug. 16, 1999) (concluding that a national bank
may invest and take warrants in a company that develops, distributes, and supports
software that enables secure payments over the Internet); Through a Joint Venture,
Two Banks' Operating Subsidiaries Were Able to Acquire a Limited Liability
Company Engaged in the Development and Distribution of Home Banking and
FinancialManagement Software and Data Processing Services, [1994-1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-625 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 677,
June 28, 1995) (concluding that a national bank may engage in a joint venture to
develop and distribute home banking and financial management software to be
distributed through the bank and through retail outlets).
16. OCC Conditional Approval No. 221 (Dec. 4, 1996), 1996 WL 742689,
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/dectconda221.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2001) (national banks may acquire and hold a minority interests in a company that
will supply a network for home banking systems) [hereinafter OCC Conditional
Approval No. 221]; OCC Conditional Approval No. 332 (Oct. 18, 1999), 1999 WL
1126586, available at http://xvww.occ.treas.gov/ interp/nov99/ca332.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2,2001) (finding that a national bank may own a minority interest in a company
that will develop and operate an electronic interbank switch to support electronic bill
presentment services over the Internet); OCC Conditional Approval No. 304 (Mar. 5,
1999), 1999 WL 246480, availableat http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/interp/apr99/ca304.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (finding that a national bank may have a minority
investment in companies that will develop and operated systems and standards to
enable banks to offer electronic bill payment and presentment services through the
Internet); OCC Conditional Approval No. 220 (Dec. 2, 1996), 1996 WL 742601,
available at http://www.oce.treas.gov/interp/ dec/conda220.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2001) (finding that national banks are permitted to acquire membership interests in
two companies that will operate an "open" stored value card system); OCC
Conditional Approval No. 339 (Nov. 16, 1999), 1999 WL 1268106, available at
http:l/wwv.occ.treas.gov/interpldec99/ca339.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (finding
that national banks may invest in a multi-bank venture to establish an entity that will
support a multiple bank digital certificate authority network system by serving as the
root certificate authority ("CA") for the sub-CA banks and by establishing and
enforcing business rules for the system) [hereinafter OCC Conditional Approval No.
221]; OCC Conditional Approval No. 289 (Oct. 2, 1998), 1998 WL 850227, available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/nov98/ca289.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (finding
that national banks may hold a minority investment in CheckFree, a company that
provides electronic commerce services, financial application software, and homebanking, bill payment, and related services to a large number of financial institutions
and their customer); A National Bank Was Able to Hold a Minority Interest in a
Company Engaged in the Design, Development, Marketing and Maintenance of a
Network for Electronic Funds Transfers and Electronic Data Interchange,Including
Transacting Electronic Commerce and Marketing Software Products for use in Its
World-Wide Electronic Commerce Network, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-049 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 732, May 10, 1996)
(concluding that a national bank may acquire and hold a minority interest in a
company that offers EDI services that allow businesses to send and receive payments,
invoices and orders worldwide).
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In addition, the OCC has also permitted other equity
investments in entities engaged in activities that are not part of the
business of banking or incidental thereto, if the bank's investment
is convenient, useful, or necessary to performing a particular and
permissible banking function.
For example, the OCC has
concluded that it was permissible for a national bank, through its
operating subsidiary, to hold various insurance company products
and investment funds that contained bank-ineligible securities in
order to hedge the subsidiary's obligations to make payments to its
employees under permissible deferred compensation plans."
Likewise, the OCC has found that a national bank may,
through a minority investment in an investment adviser, indirectly
hold limited equity interests in private and public investment funds
for which the adviser serves as investment manager even though
the portfolio of those funds contained investments that were not
bank permissible investments." These limited and normally bank
impermissible holdings were found to be necessary by the adviser
in order to compete effectively in the investment advisory business
due to the demands of the market and certain practical
considerations. 9 Accordingly, the limited holdings were allowed
because they were necessary to enable the investment adviser to
conduct its bank permissible investment advisory activities.
Similarly, the OCC permitted national banks to have
limited holdings of bank impermissible securities to hedge bank
permissible equity derivative transactions that were originated by
bank customers.' In that context, the OCC concluded that the
activity was a permissible incidental activity to the business of

17. Bank Could Use Impermissible Investments to Hedge Deferred Compensation
Obligations, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-375
(OCC Interpretive Letter No. 878, Dec. 22, 1999).
18. Bank Could Acquire Non-Controlling Interest in LLC that Provided
Investment Advisory Services, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81-416 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 897, Oct. 23, 2000).
19. The OCC found that these holdings were necessary because 1) investors
generally demanded that advisers hold an interest in the managed funds, 2) they
secured favorable tax treatment for investors, and 3) they support compensation
arrangements required to attract and retain qualified staff. Id. at pp. 90,253-55.
20. Banks Could Use Securities to Hedge Equity Derivative Transactions,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)

Letter No. 892, Sept. 13, 2000).

81-411 (OCC Interpretive

2001] "DECONSTRUCTION" OFBANKTNG FUNCTIONS

147

banking because the holding of the hedging securities was
convenient, useful, and necessary to the banks' ability to conduct
permissible equity derivative transactions.
In another case
involving hedging of risks arising from bank permissible activities,
the OCC concluded that a national bank may buy cash-settled
options in certain commodity future contracts where the
underlying commodity is the primary collateral on an agricultural
loan made by the bank in order to hedge the bank's risk with
respect to the value of the collateral*'
These two lines of precedent authorizing minority
investments in firms engaged in activities where the investment is
incidental to the business of banking provide support for limited
strategic investments by national banks in firms developing or
producing technology essential to the bank's operations.
From a bank supervisory perspective, these types of
strategic investments may have some advantages. Ordinarily,
bank supervisors' key concerns with third party provider
arrangements include worries about due diligence in vendor
selection and quality control of vendor performance. When the
banking firm chooses a technology partner for a particular venture
and remains involved, with the capacity to participate in the
development and implementation of systems and services
produced by the venture, those worries could be lessened because
the risks associated with outsourcing are reduced by the bank's
ongoing level of involvement.
However, in any case where a bank, by contract or
otherwise, causes functions or operations to be performed for itself
by a third party, the federal bank regulators have the authority to
examine and to regulate the performance of the functions or
operations to the same extent as if they were being performed by
the bank itself on its own premises.' Despite this direct authority
over service providers, the regulators have emphasized that the
management of banks engaged in outsourcing functions and
operations to third parties has a responsibility to adequately
21. Bank Could Use Commodity Futures Options to Hedge Agricultural Loans,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)

Letter No. 896, Aug. 21, 2000).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1867(c) (Supp. V 2000).

81-415 (OCC Interpretive
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manage the servicing relationship and to identify and control the
risks that can arise from it.
Accordingly, the OCC and the other federal banking
agencies recently issued joint guidance on "Risk Management of
Outsourcing Technology Services" to assist banks in effectively
managing the risks of outsourcing arrangements.' This guidance
urges bank management to assess risks in technology outsourcing,
exercise due diligence in selecting a provider, ensure that there are
appropriate provisions in contracts to address business
requirements and key risk factors, and exercise appropriate
oversight regarding a service provider's controls, condition, and
performance.
In the Outsourcing Guidance, the regulators emphasize the
importance of conducting appropriate due diligence regarding the
third party prior to entering into any contract for outsourced
services. This includes an evaluation of the service provider's
financial strength, reputation, policies, controls and risk
management procedures. The Guidance notes that particular
attention should be paid to policies and controls governing the
security, customer privacy and disclosure, and availability of
services to insure their adequacy. 4
Likewise, the Guidance counsels that contracts between the
bank and a third party provider should appropriately address the
key risks and essential needs and standards identified by the bank
with respect to the outsourced function. The contract should
ensure that the accountabilities of all parties are clearly defined
and that measurable performance standards are set. It should
include provisions for the timely and orderly intervention in the
event of a substandard performance by the outsourcer. Finally,
23. Outsourcing Guidance, supra note 6.

24. A similar requirement is contained in the recently issued interagency
guidelines establishing standards for safeguarding customer information that
implement sections 501 and 505(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [hereinafter the
501 Guidelines]. 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B (2000) (as amended by 66 Fed. Reg. 8616
(Feb. 1, 2001)). Specifically, the 501 Guidelines require that an institution conduct
appropriate security due diligence in the selection of service providers, including a
review of measures taken by the service provider to protect customer information

and a review of the controls the service provider has in place to insure that any subservicer used by the service provider will be able to meet the objectives of the
Guidelines.

2001] "DECONSTRUCTION" OFBANKING FUNCTIONS

149

bank management should ensure that the contract addresses
security and privacy issues.'
Most importantly, the Guidance emphasizes that bank
management should establish a comprehensive, well-defined, and
ongoing oversight process for managing outsourced relationships
and third party dependencies supporting the bank. The increased
reliance upon third parties and partners to perform critical
banking functions lessens management's direct control, and as
such requires intensified vendor management. Such intensified
management requires proactive oversight over all third party
dependencies including joint ventures, outsourcing activities of
vendors themselves, and other outsourcings that have a material
impact on the bank. The oversight program should monitor each
service provider's controls, condition, and performance and should
be performed by personnel with appropriate expertise.' To that
end, management should also ensure that vendors provide
sufficient timely and accurate information concerning outsourced
functions and activities so as to allow management to carry out
their monitoring responsibilities.
The OCC has focused also on outsourcing relationships
that concentrate on particular functions or products. The OCC
recently issued Advisory Letter 2000-9 (August 19, 2000) that
warns about third-party risk with respect to arrangements relating
to the origination or servicing of extensions of credit. Among
other things, this Advisory noted that while outsourcing is a useful
method to obtain expertise, banks must have a sufficient
knowledge about the activity and the risks involved in order to
provide adequate oversight and controls.
25. The Outsourcing Guidance suggests that the outsource contract should
prohibit the service provider and its agents from using or disclosing the institution's
information, except as necessary to or consistent with providing contracted services.

Outsourcing Guidance, supra note 6. Similarly, the recently issued 501 Guidelines
provide that a financial institution's contract with its service providers require the

provider to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of the
501 Guidelines in maintaining the security and privacy of customer information. 501
Guidelines, supra note 24.
26. Likewise, the 501 Guidelines indicate that each financial institution must
exercise an appropriate level of oversight over each of its service providers to confirm

that the service provider is implementing the provider's security measures. 501
Guidelines, supra note 24.
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It is notable that a bank may be better-positioned to
manage many of the concerns raised by the Outsourcing Guidance
and Advisory Letter if the bank's involvement is more than that of
simply contracting with a third party vendor to supply a product or
service. It is in this regard that bank strategic investments may
have some collateral supervisory benefits because they facilitate an
involved and ongoing role for the bank in the product or service
being developed and provided for the bank by another entity.
B.

ProvidingAccess to Productsand Services of Other
Providers

The offering of financial products and services also can be
deconstructed, focusing on the choices banking firms make
regarding how, and which, financial and non-financial products
and services to make available to their customers. A banking
company may decide that it wants to meet customers' desires for
access to certain financial or non-financial products and services
and may arrange for them to be available from a third party. For
example, banking companies could offer insurance from an
affiliated insurance company, or securities brokerage through an
affiliated brokerage firm, or could choose to make arrangements
with one or more non-affiliated third parties to provide those
products and services to the bank's customers.
These choices may take the form of marketing
arrangements, where, for example, a bank will contract for a
company to offer its products or services to the bank's customers
from the bank's premises. Or the bank may provide statementstuffers and other marketing materials from sellers of various
financial products and services, or identify other service providers
as an accommodation to customers. Essentially, these are oldfashioned examples of how a bank deconstructs aspects of its
relationships with customers; determining what products and
services they want and then how best to provide them.
Traditionally, these types of activities were referred to as acting as
a "finder."
The authority of national and many state banks to act as
"finders," bringing together buyers and sellers of products and
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services for transactions that the parties themselves negotiate and
consummate, is well-recognized." With advances in technology
and increased use of the Internet, banking firms are able to act as a
finder electronically on a far broader scale. New technology
introduces a new dimension of finder activities, providing not just
a new channel for banks to market their own financial products
and services, but a vastly expanded means to provide customers
with access to those of third parties. Technology also helps a bank
couple functions offered by the bank with the products and
services of third parties that it makes available. Thus, banks may
become full service providers without being full service producers.
For example, both national banks and financial holding
companies have been recognized to have authority as finders to
host electronic marketplace Internet web sites that provide links to
the web sites of third party buyers and sellers, and allow sellers (or
buyers) to submit expressions of interest, bids, offers, orders, and
confirmations at the linked sites.' Similarly, both national banks
27. A national bank "may act as a finder in bringing together a buyer and a
seller." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1002(a) (2000). The activity of acting as a finder "includes,
without limitation, identifying potential parties, making inquiries as to interest,
introducing or arranging meetings of interested parties, and otherwise bringing
parties together for a transaction that the parties themselves negotiate and
consummate." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1002(b) (2000). The finder function is an activity
authorized for national banks under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) as part of the business
of banking. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 824, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-273 (Feb. 27, 1998); OCC Corporate Decision No. 9760 (July 1, 1997), 1997 WL 402653, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/jul97/
cd97-60.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter OCC Corporate Decision No. 9760]; and OCC Conditional Approval Letter No. 221, supra note 16.
28. See, e.g., OCC Corporate Decision No. 2000-11 (June 24, 2000), 2000 WL
1123767, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/julOOcdOO-11.pdf (last visited
Feb. 2, 2001) (concluding that a national bank may act as a finder to bring program
beneficiaries together with program benefits); OCC Conditional Approval No. 347
(Jan. 29, 2000), 2000 WL 132593, available at http://wvw.occ.treas.gov/interp/janO0/
ca347.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (permitting web page hyperlinks for customers to
access products and services considered useful for small businesses) [hereinafter
OCC Conditional Approval No. 347]; Institutions Could Invest in Providers of
Internet-Related Services to Merchants, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 81-369 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 875, Oct. 31, 1999) (permitting a
national bank to create a "virtual mall," a bank-hosted collection of web pages with
links to third-party vendors' web sites) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter No.
875]; A National Bank Was Able to Establish an OperatingSubsidiary to Act as an
Informationaland Payments Interface Between InsuranceUnderwritersand Insurance
Agencies, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-601 (OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 653, Dec. 22, 1994). See also, Finder Activities, 65 Fed. Reg.
80735 (Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)) (listing permissible
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and financial holding companies are able to operate web sites that
allow multiple buyers and sellers to exchange information
concerning the products and services they are willing to buy or sell,
locate potential counterparties for transactions, aggregate orders
for goods and services with those made by other parties, and enter
into transactions between themselves at the bank's site. 9
In either approach, the bank or financial holding company
may negotiate with sellers to provide preferred terms to buyers
that purchase through the web link or web site, and establish rules
of general applicability governing how its finder function
operates.' These operating rules could, for example, establish
parameters under which buyers and sellers submit bids and offers
to the finder, the circumstances under which the finder will match
bids and offers, and rules that govern the manner in which buyers
and sellers bind themselves to the terms of a transaction facilitated
by the finder. The finder authority is not limited to provision of
financial products and services, so these activities could pertain to
transactions involving virtually any product or service. 1
This last point raises various issues. One vital question
concerning the bank's role is the extent to which it may couple its
functions and activities with the products and services of third
finder activities for financial holding companies).
29. Bank Could Offer Internet Services and Payment Services to Small Business

Customers, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 856, [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-313 (Mar. 5, 1999) (concluding that a national bank can
host commercially enabled web sites for small retailers); OCC Interpretive Letter No.
875, supra note 28 (hosting commercially enabled web sites); OCC Conditional
Approval No. 361 (Mar. 3, 2000), 2000 WL 382887, available at http://www.occ.treas.

gov/interp/ marO0/ca361.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (finding that a national bank
can develop and host a web site for a government agency that will allow the public,

consumers, and other agencies to access or purchase services, information, forms, and
products from that agency); OCC Conditional Approval No. 369 (Feb. 25, 2000),
2000 WL 538069, available at http:/www.occ.treas.gov/interp/aprOO/ca369.pdf (last

visited Feb. 2, 2001) (finding that a national bank may establish an Internet site that
will function as an electronic central facility to enable businesses to negotiate and
organize among themselves aggregate buying, selling, or financing efforts, and for
other collaborative efforts) [hereinafter OCC Conditional Approval No. 369]. See
also, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,735 (Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1002 (2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 80,735 (Dec. 22,2000) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)).

31. See, e.g., OCC Corporate Decision No. 97-60, supra note 27 (concluding that
a national bank may operate a web site providing consumers and dealers with
detailed information on used cars for sale that meet purchaser preferences - a
virtual used car lot).
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parties that it makes available. In the case of financial holding
companies, the finder authority has only recently been recognized,
and no precedents yet exist outside of the new rule. In the case of
national banks, precedents do exist that support combining the
finder authority with other functions that are permissible as part of
the business of banking. These include activities such as payments
processing and information management, as well as a limited
amount of non-banking activity that is permissible because it is
"incidental"-convenient or useful-to the bank-permissible
activities including the finder function. For example, national
banks offering to host commercially enabled web sites also, as an
incidental service, may offer web site design and development.'
Increasingly, national banks are finding that they can
combine products and services they produce themselves with third
party products and services to provide their customers with a fullservice menu. For example, the first Internet-only national bank
to focus on the small business niche planned to offer loans and
deposit products for small businesses as well as a virtual mall with
links to third parties providing services and products of particular
interest to small businesses.33 Likewise, the OCC has found that a
national bank may make a minority investment in a firm that, as a
registered broker, will use the Internet to provide retail brokerage
services, lending, and insurance-related services to clients who are
customers of financial institutions that have agreements with the
firm.' Finally, a national bank may provide, via Internet links, its
merchant-processing customers with information and access to
third party vendors of services for the merchant processing
industry."
However, whenever a banking firm is providing its

32. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 875, supra note 28 (concluding that a national
bank may, incidental to its offering of commercially engaged web site hosting,
provide web design services to its merchant customers).
33. OCC Conditional Approval No. 347, supra note 28.
34. Bank Could Acquire Non-Controlling Interest in Online Services Corp.,

[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-408 (OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 889, Apr. 24,2000) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter No. 889].
35. OCC Corporate Decision No. 99-35 (Oct. 20, 1999), 1999 WL 1126571,
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/nov99/cd99-35.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,

2001).
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customers with access to products not originated by the bank, it
must recognize that a wide range of customer relationship issues
inevitably arise. Does the customer utilizing a bank's finder
service understand that the products and services being obtained
are those of a third party, not the bank, and that the bank does not
warrant their quality? How realistic is it for the bank to assume
that it can divorce itself entirely from the product or service
procured through the bank's facilities and how involved does the
bank want to become in quality control of those products and
services?
One of the core competencies of banks is acting as a
customer interface and managing customer relationships. From the
customer's perspective, a bank adds value most fundamentally by
assuring the quality that is expected or sought by the customer.
Deconstruction offers banks an opportunity to fully exercise this
competency, but to fulfill its customers' expectations, the bank
must exercise appropriate controls and oversight as a manager of
the contacts that are occurring with its customers. The bank's
reputation (its key market advantage) rests upon its ability to
devise and enforce standards meeting customer expectations
regarding the quality of products and services that are provided
through the bank.
Similarly, a bank must consider what risks consumers face
(and are willing to accept) in situations where the bank facilitates
arrangements with third parties. If a banking organization
establishes operating rules for transactions conducted via its webbased finder capacity, can its rules allocate the risk of
unauthorized use to a consumer? If so, what is the consumer's
potential exposure and how effectively is he or she informed of
this?
High-technology finder functions are also fertile ground for
privacy issues. When a bank acts as a finder, what kind of
information does the bank acquire about the customers of that
service and the transactions they execute? What does it do with
that information?36
36. National banks establishing web links or virtual malls to third party sites have

generally committed to adopt a privacy policy concerning the treatment of personal
customer information that recognizes customer expectations for privacy and provides
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Because of these concerns, the OCC in its electronic finders
letters has provided significant guidance with respect to what
prudent measures are expected of banks acting as electronic
finders by establishing links between the bank's web site and the
web site of third party providers of products and services.
The OCC expects banks engaging in such activities to have
adequate risk controls.' The bank should conduct appropriate
due diligence on the third party and its site. Does the third party
deliver what it promises? Does it have adequate security for its
web site and data? Does it have a privacy policy that is similar to
the bank? Also, the bank should provide adequate disclosures to
its customers, especially with respect to its limited role and
responsibility with respect to the third party products and services.
The bank's web site should also clearly and conspicuously indicate
that the bank does not provide, endorse, or guarantee the products
of the third party.'
Because of deconstruction, banks have the option to move
away from being complete vertically and horizontally integrated
providers of financial services and are adopting a more flexible
standards for the use, collection and retention of such information. Further, they
have made that policy accessible through a link from each pertinent page of the
bank's website. Such banks have stated that if personally identifiable customer
information is provided to third party, the finder will insist that the third party adhere
to strict privacy guidelines to provide for keeping such information confidential.
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 875, supra note 28; OCC Conditional Approval No. 369,
supra note 29; OCC Corporate Decision No. 2000-08 (June 1, 2000), 2000 WL
1123762, available at http:lwww.occ.treas.gov/interp/julOO/cdOO-08.pdf (last visited
Feb. 19, 2001) [hereinafter OCC Corporate Decision No. 2000-08]. Likewise,
national banks offering electronic web hosting services to their merchant customers
also have faced privacy issues even though they do not deal directly with the
merchants' customers; customer data will be stored on their servers. Accordingly,
such hosting banks have committed that they will not sell customer data to third
parties. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 875, supra note 28.
37. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 875, supra note 28; OCC Conditional Approval
No. 347, supra note 28; OCC Conditional Approval No. 368 (Apr. 3,2000), 2000 WL
538052, availableat http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/aprOO/ca368.pdf (last visited Feb.
19, 2001); OCC Conditional Approval No. 369, supra note 29; OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 889, supra note 34; OCC Corporate Decision No. 2000-08, supra note 36.
38. The OCC also encourages banks to provide additional disclosures that are
appropriate to the particular products or services that are provided by the third party.
For example, for links to providers of non-deposit investment products, the OCC has
encouraged banks to alert customers to the risks of those products, for example, by
stating that the products are not insured by the FDIC, not a deposit, and may lose
value. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 889, supra note 34.
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approach of relying upon and supporting third party products,
services, and relationships. In that new role, however, banks
become increasingly involved in managing relationships with third
parties that are producing and providing services to the bank or to
customers of the bank. A new and evolving type of service,
aggregation," demonstrates just how far this evolution as
relationship manager may develop. In providing aggregation
services, a bank no longer is providing products, or even access to
products, but rather is managing the data and, in some cases, the
substance of relationships that their customers have with third
parties.
This acquisition, compilation, presentation, and storage of
information pertaining to customers' relationships with third party
providers could expose the aggregator to risks and certainly
requires appropriate control mechanisms. Aggregation services
are rapidly evolving; however, industry standards and practices
have not yet matured. Moreover, considerable uncertainty
remains with respect to compliance obligations relating to legal
and regulatory requirements.'
C.

Marketing Processesand Activitiesfor which the Bank has
ParticularCapacitiesand Competencies

Yet another manifestation of a deconstructed perspective
of the banking business happens when a banking firm has a
particular skill, competency or other advantage in providing a
39. Aggregation is a service that gathers information from many source web sites
and presents that information in a consolidated format to the customer. The
information normally pertains to the customer's account at the source site, such as
credit card, brokerage, and banking data. Typically the aggregator obtains the
personal account information using customer-provided user names and passwords to
enter target web sites on behalf of the customer and then downloading (or
"scraping") the data. Some aggregation sites also offer customers the ability to
initiate transactions effecting accounts at source sites by entering instructions at the
aggregation site that the aggregator then enters on behalf of the customer at the
source site after signing as the customer.

40. Currently, Regulation E (12 C.F.R. § 205), which implements the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. §1693-1693r (1988)), does not specifically address the
responsibilities of aggregators. However, the Federal Reserve Board staff has
requested comments to determine whether additional staff commentary should

address this issue. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 65 Fed. Reg. 40,061 (proposed
June 29,2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 205).
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specific product or service. In that case, the reverse of the first
situation, discussed above, occurs. Rather than "importing" a
particular function from a third party vendor, the bank "exports"
to third parties components of operations that it conducts for itself.
In so doing, the banking firm is optimizing the use and value of its
facilities and competencies as well as avoiding economic waste. In
this type of deconstruction, the bank is effectively cherry-picking
its own operations.
This can occur in a variety of settings. There may be some
activities where large scale is a comparative advantage, and a bank
with a capacity for the activity will exploit that competency by
performing the activity, not just for itself, but also for other banks
and non-banks. Current examples include mortgage servicing,
credit cards, payments processing and administration, and the
fiduciary and securities custodial business.
Technology affords new opportunities here as well. And
national banks have been recognized to have the authority to
pursue these opportunities in marketing their electronic
competencies and capacities to others. For example, a subsidiary
of a national bank approved to act as a certification authority' is
also "manufacturing" digital certificates for third party certificate
authorities. Since the issuance of digital certificates is part of the
business of banking, the production of such certificates for others
to issue is likewise permissible.42 The bank is exporting to others
its competence in producing digital certificates.
Undoubtedly, the correspondent authority of national
banks can also enable them to engage in these deconstructed
activities. Correspondent banking activities are not limited to core
banking functions, but instead can extend to any corporate or
banking service a bank may perform for itself.43 Thus, the range of
41. OCC Conditional Approval No. 267 (Jan. 12,1998), 1998 WL 41538, available
at http://wvw.occ.treas.gov/interp/j an98/ca267.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) (finding
that a national bank may act as a certification authority to enable subscribers to
generate digital signatures that verify the identity of a sender of an electronic
message).
42. See OCC Conditional Approval No. 339, supra note 16 (finding that a
national bank may invest in multi-bank venture to establish an entity that will
support a multiple bank CA network system by, among other things, generating
digital certificates to be issued by the participating banks).
43. See, e.g., Establishment of Operating Subsidiary Offering Real Estate
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electronic correspondent banking services offered by national
banks continues to expand and so too may the range of entities to
whom a national bank may offer correspondent services."
For example, the OCC recently authorized a national bank
that has developed extensive competence in digital imaging to
export that service to other financial institutions. This is a
permissible correspondent service.' The OCC has also permitted
national banks that develop competence and capacity in electronic
finder activities (including commercially enabled web hosting) to
sell these services wholesale to other financial institutions that
wish to offer them to their merchant customers. This is both an
exercise of the bank's electronic finder authority and a valid
correspondent service.46 The OCC has permitted a national bank
that developed competency in the selection and design of
computer network services and related hardware to sell those
services to other financial institutions as a correspondent banking
service and, thus, part of the business of banking." The OCC's
letter also concludes that the subsidiary's sale of full function
hardware as part of a package of network services is "incidental"
to those correspondent services.48 A long line of OCC precedent

Appraisal Services for Bank, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 85-691 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 467, Jan. 24, 1989) (concluding that a
national bank may offer wide range of correspondent services).
44. See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval No. 322 (July 30, 1999), 1999 WL
711414, availableat http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/interp/aug99/ca322.pdf (last visited Feb.

2, 2001); OCC Conditional Approval No. 276 (May 8, 1998), 1998 WL 363812,
availableat http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/interp/jun98/ca276.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2001);

Expansion of Bank Service CorporationActivities, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-215 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 513, June 18, 1990).
The broader range of activities permissible for financial holding companies under
GLBA may also have implications for the scope of potential customers of banks'
correspondent services.
45. Bank Could Offer External Client ElectronicStorage and Retrieval System for

Documents, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-407 (OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 888, Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter No.
888].
46. OCC Corporate Decision No. 2000-08, supra note 36.
47. Provision of Investment Portfolio Management Service and Computer
Networking Packages for Other FinancialInstitutions by an Operating Subsidiary,

[1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
81-118 (OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 754, Nov. 6, 1996) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter No.
754].
48. Id.
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permits national banks to provide data processing and
communications services to other financial institutions as a
correspondent service that is part of the business of banking.4 9
Moreover, the OCC has found that national banks may, as
part of the business of banking, market to non-financial firms
imaging services that focus predominantly on banking, financial or
economic data.' The OCC has also held that where a national
bank has acquired good faith excess capacity in imaging (due to,
for example, the batch nature of its operations), the bank may sell
that capacity to others without regard to the nature of the firm or
its images."1
49. As noted in an OCC Interpretive Letter approving an operating subsidiary
that sells computer network services and related hardware to other financial
institutions:
[t]he OCC has allowed national banks as a permissible
correspondent activity to provide data processing and other
computer-related services to other financial institutions. For
example, national banks may provide strategic planning and
corporate development services, including assistance with program
installation, simulation, and computer modeling. [ ] National
banks may also provide other financial institutions with electronic
"gateways" to communicate and receive financial information and
to conduct transactions. Interpretive Letter No. 516, [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-220 (July 12,
1990) (bank operating subsidiary may participate in creating,
leasing, and licensing communications systems, computers, analytic
software, and related equipment and services for sharing
information concerning financial instruments and economic
information and news); Interpretive Letter No. 346, [1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85-516 (July 31,
1985) (bank operating subsidiary may provide electronic
information and transaction services and linkage for financial
settlement services). Moreover, national banks may market
specially designed computerized "smart phones" that enable other
financial institutions to communicate with their customers through
a supporting network of computers and software. Interpretive
Letter No. 611, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 83-449 (Nov. 23, 1992). Finally, the OCC has previously
concluded that national banks may provide communication
support services to other financial institutions, including the use of
electronic networks for transmission of visual, voice, and data
communications.
Interpretive Letter No. 513, [[1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83-215 (June 18,
1990)].
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 754, supra note 47, at p. 90,271.
50. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 888, supra note 45.
51. Id.
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Finally, a national bank that has developed competency in
stored value systems may design, install and support closed SVC
(stored value card) systems at universities and other institutions
and, incidental to that, may set-up those systems to support nonbanking smart card functions (e.g., library records and building
access control)." The latter feature is incidental to the stored value
function because it is "necessary for customer use" and "necessary
for successful marketing" of a SVC system based upon smart card
technology. 3
From a bank supervisory perspective, banks providing
electronic banking services to third parties need to insure that
their operations, responsibilities, and liabilities are sufficiently
clear so that serviced institutions can adequately carry out
effective due diligence reviews and all ongoing oversight of the
relationship. Servicing banks also have a responsibility to provide
serviced institutions with the information necessary to identify,
control, and monitor risks associated with the electronic banking
service arrangement.'
D.

"Franchising"the Bank's Attributes

The fourth form of deconstruction occurs when a bank
enters into relationships with third parties in which, effectively, the
bank sells or leases its reputation, attributes, or legal status so as to
enable the third party to use those in connection with activities or
services predominantly conducted by the third party. Specifically,
some banks have recognized that deconstruction can enable them
to exploit certain reputational and regulatory attributes that may
give them a competitive advantage. To that end, services or
52. A National Bank Could Make a Minority Investment in a Limited Liability
Company that Would Develop, Market, Deliver and Maintain Stored Value and

Information Systems Using "Smart" Card Technology, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)

81-101 (OCC Interpretive Letter No. 737, Aug. 19,

1996).
53. Id.
54. The Outsourcing Guidance does not exclude from its scope services received
from other financial institutions. See Outsourcing Guidance, supra note 6. Thus,

banks that provide services to other banks should expect to be held to the same
standards of due diligence, controls, and oversight as would apply to other servicing
entities.
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activities are performed in the bank's name, but in association with
third parties with potentially minimal activity by the bank. In
these relationships, the third party's products or activities may be
endowed with various attributes of the bank.
Technology both encourages and facilitates this approach.
Non-banks increasingly find that technology enables them to
successfully offer "bank-like" services, but without the expense of
a bank branch system or a bank charter. Moreover, computer
systems enable these non-banks to integrate a set of distinct
operations-some performed by banks and some by themselvessuch as scoring a loan applicant and funding a loan, into what
appears to the consumer as a single seamless product or service.
This approach goes beyond deconstruction of the bank's
special skills and competencies; it involves deconstructing the
advantages in market perception and legal treatment that arise
from status as a regulated financial institution. For example,
because they are subject to an extensive regulatory regime, banks
generally benefit from a high level of public trust. In addition,
banks have unique access to payments systems that non-banks
covet. All types of banks and thrifts are authorized to use the
interest rates on loans permitted by the state in which they are
located, notwithstanding more restrictive rates required by states
in which their customers are located.55 And, for national banks
and federal thrifts, certain types of state laws are not applicable
because of principles of federal preemption.
This fourth type of deconstruction is the newest, and
potentially most problematic. In this type of deconstruction, a
bank is detaching its name, reputation and legal status from its
own activities and permitting its attributes to be used in
connection with the products and services of a third party. The
implications of this type of "franchising" of a bank's attributes are
considerably more complex than when Harley Davidson decides to
associate its brand with a new line of clothing.
Recent manifestations of this type of deconstruction appear
in various efforts by non-banks to obtain access to bank funding
and payments systems. One example is the so-called "Rent-a55. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994); 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (1994); 12 U.S.C. § 1831(d) (1994).
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BIN" arrangement, designed to afford a non-bank access to a
credit card payments system. In this type arrangement, a bank
permits a non-bank to use the bank's BIN ("Bank Identification
Number") issued by VISA, by issuing a credit card to be used for
the third party's products or services. In exchange for a fee paid to
the bank when the account is opened and periodically thereafter,
the non-bank acquires all the credit card receivables, receives all
interest payments and other finance charges, and benefits from the
bank's authority to use the interest rates permitted in the state in
which the bank is located, regardless of the limits on rates that may
apply in the state in which the customer is located.
In another example, non-bank financial product vendors
seeking to avoid the application of state consumer protection laws
may approach banks to enter into marketing arrangements where
banks and thrifts fund certain types of loans marketed by the
vendor, such as so-called "payday" or "title" loans. The loans are
actually offered, not at the institution's regular branches, but at
offices of the third party vendor at other locations. After the
institution funds the loan, the third party then immediately
purchases all or virtually all of the loans from it. For this activity,
the institution is paid a fee. Through high-tech loan scoring
systems and funds transfer arrangements, the actual roles of the
institution and the third party will be invisible to the customer.
In these situations, the third party's general objective is to
involve a national bank or a federal thrift, both of which enjoy the
ability to "export" interest rates allowed by the state in which they
are located to customers in other states,56 and which, under
principles of federal preemption, are not subject to certain types of
state laws. By having its loans funded by an entity that enjoys
federal preemption, the third party seeks to avoid compliance with
a variety of state usury and consumer protection laws, yet the third
party itself is not subject to the responsibilities and federal
regulation applicable to a national bank or federal thrift.
Finally, in connection with joint marketing arrangements of
deposit and payment products by non-banks, usually conducted
over the Internet, some banks have entered into agreements with
56. As noted above, state banks that have thrifts also have this ability.

2001] "DECONSTRUCTION" OFBANKING FUNCTIONS

163

third parties authorizing them to initiate ACH transactions 7 that
result from the sale of bank products. Under these arrangements,
the non-bank is endowed with the bank's authority to access the
payments systems-and the bank can be exposed to considerable
risk.' In one case where a national bank authorized a non-bank to
initiate ACH debit transactions under a joint marketing
arrangement of its deposit products, the non-bank third party
failed to provide adequate controls to ensure that the resulting
ACH debit transactions initiated were properly authorized. When
fraud resulted from this activity, the bank incurred reputation loss
and potential exposure under breached ACH warranties.
Generally, when a bank allows products and services
actually originated by third parties to be presented as its own, the
bank can be exposed to substantial financial loss and damage to its
reputation if it fails to maintain adequate quality control over
those products and services and adequate oversight over the third
party activities. The act of simply delegating customer interactions
to a third party also risks a priceless asset-the bank's good
name-if customers are not treated according to standards
expected from the bank. Often these relationships involve an
element where the third party is acting as a service provider since
it conducts activities on behalf of the bank in originating products
or services, e.g., the third party originates loan or deposit accounts
for the bank or initiates payments.
Obviously, the issues with this kind of deconstruction are
quality control, adequate oversight, and reputational exposure.
57. Automated Clearing House Transactions (ACH transactions) refers to a
nationwide batch-oriented electronic funds transfer system that provides for the
interbank clearing of electronic payments for participating depository financial
institutions. See What is ACH?, at http://www.nacha.org/About/what isach_.htm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2001).
58. Under the current ACH rules, a third-party service provider may transmit
ACH entry directly to the ACH operator, provided it has obtained permission of the
originating bank (ODFI) to do so under the ODFI's routing number. In these
transactions, the ODFI makes a number of warranties under the ACH rules for each
entry transmitted by the service provider regardless of whether it is seen by the bank
or not. Most significantly, the bank warrants that the customer originating the entry
has obtained proper authorization for each entry including ACH debit transactions.
See NAT'L AUTOMATED CLEARINGHOUSE ASS'N., ACH RULES, A COMPLETE GUIDE
TO RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING =H ACH NETWORK (2001) (available for
purchase from the NAHCA at http://www.nacha.org).
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This is particularly true with respect to oversight of the servicing
activities conducted by the third party on behalf of the bank. 9
Unfortunately, in recent examples of this type of deconstruction
we have seen banks associate their name and special status with
products that were abusive to consumers and third party vendors
that did not conduct their operations with the diligence expected
of a regulated financial institution. Frequently, the bank failed to
conduct adequate due diligence and on-going monitoring of the
third party.' The result was both credit losses and damage to the
banks' reputation.
For this reason, the OCC (in conjunction with the Office of
Thrift Supervision) recently issued two Advisory Letters alerting
national banks and federally chartered thrifts to the significant
concerns that can arise from abusive third-party marketing efforts
such as "title loans" and "payday loans."61 These letters urge
national banks to think carefully about the risks involved in such
relationships. The OCC intends to scrutinize carefully any such
arrangements and to use its supervisory authority to examine the
operations of vendors who act as service providers to national
banks sought out to deliver potentially abusive products.
Moreover, if litigation should result from such abusive
deconstruction of the national bank charter, the OCC has
indicated that it will not necessarily support arguments that such
59. These fourth type of relationships frequently are a blend of the first and
second, i.e., banks will enter into relationships with third parties that combine
characteristics of a both a servicing relationship and joint marketing arrangement. In
these situations, the bank must be sure to adequately control both aspects of the
relationship, e.g., it should not focus only on the joint marketing, and neglect the
servicer aspects.
60. Indeed, with respect to the servicing portions of these relationships, the bank

should probably conduct enhanced due diligence and oversight. Unlike the normal
servicer that has no independent interest in the underlying operations that it
processes, the "franchised" servicers are primarily interested in those operations as
the source of their profits. Thus, the franchised servicer will be tempted to conduct
those operations and processes in a way that enhances the success of the underlying
operations even at the cost of increased risk to the "serviced" bank.
61. Payday Lending, [Volume 6] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-790 (OCC
Advisory Letter No. 2000-10, Nov. 27, 2000), available at http:llvww.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/advisory/2000-10.doc (last visited Feb. 2, 2001); Title Loan Programs,[Volume 6]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-791 (OCC Advisory Letter No. 2000-11, Nov. 27,
2000), availableat http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-11.doc (last visited Feb.

2,2001).
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joint arrangements with national banks exempt the products from
state consumer protection laws.
All of this is not to say that this type of "franchising"
deconstruction is always inadvisable or inappropriate. Experience
does strongly indicate, however, that when a bank's role in the
origination and marketing of a product or service for which it
carries primary responsibility is only superficial and it has little
substantive involvement, the bank may have placed its reputation
and safety and soundness at significant risk. Moreover, in those
cases, it is questionable as a policy matter whether the bank or
thrift should be able to simply bestow the benefits and attributes of
its regulated entity status on a third party that is not subject to the
responsibilities and regulation that apply to the bank and thrift.
III. CONCLUSION
This framework of analysis demonstrates how technology is
propelling fundamental changes in the financial industry.
Although we have touched on many issues in this review, in many
ways, we have barely scratched the surface. But, the abundance of
issues to consider should not obscure the core message:
"Deconstruction" of the banking business should not be confused
with "destruction" of the business. To the contrary, when coupled
with the potential of technology, prudent,strategic and responsible
deconstruction of the banking business may be vital to the future
business of banking.
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